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 Recent developments in various branches of political science underscore the importance 
of empirical investigation of impartial views. This paper proposes and tests an empirical model 
of impartiality, inspired by Adam Smith (1759), that is based on the moral judgments of 
informed third parties (or spectators). The model predicts that spectatorship produces properties 
widely considered desirable in both normative and descriptive political science research, namely, 
unbiasedness and consensus. This informs a vignette experiment that elicits moral judgments 
about real world political economy issues while varying the information conditions and roles of 
respondents (spectator and stakeholder) across treatments. The results indicate that spectator 
views are unbiased, and that relevant information reduces stakeholder bias to insignificance, 
whereas irrelevant information reduces bias but does not eliminate it. Relevant information also 
promotes a kind of consensus. I argue that this model can complement empirical and theoretical 
work on deliberation, public opinion and political behavior. 
 
Keywords: impartiality, spectator, consensus, deliberation, public opinion, bias 
 
 
Ultimately, individuals’ beliefs about what is the right or fair economic policy for the nation are difficult 
to explain. … Since these policy preferences appear to be one of the main forces driving voting behavior, 
however, explaining them is clearly a key question in American political economy. 
 – Stephen Ansolabehere, Jonathan Rodden and James M. Snyder, Jr. (2006). 
Many questions (about empirical deliberation research) remain, above all concerning the contributions of 
the individual elements of the deliberative treatment. … How much difference would it make to keep the 
treatment the same but settle for real-world levels of balance, say? 
 – James S. Fishkin and Robert C. Luskin (2005). 
 
Can we know, to some degree of certainty, whether moral judgments are genuinely impartial, or, 
if not, to what degree they are biased by interests or unbalanced information? The first question 
is critical to the major theoretical traditions in ethics that provide the normative foundation for 
most political philosophy and public policy research, since those traditions rest on some claim 
about how actual judgments are, or would be, made under conditions of impartiality. Impartiality 
and bias also have relevance for political behavior in light of certain recent developments. Many 
observers of American politics allege that it has become polarized and that political reporting and 
discourse are characterized by increasing bias, a seemingly inauspicious trend for advocates of 
deliberative democracy. In addition, recent findings in political science bolster the view that both 
morals and interests affect issue preferences and that these preferences, in turn, explain vote 
choice (Ansolabehere, Rodden and Snyder, 2006, 2008). Studying impartiality and bias promises 
to help us better understand and assess these claims. 
 This paper proposes and tests an empirical model of impartiality inspired by the spectator 
theory of Adam Smith (1759). Specifically (and in response to questions raised in the quotes 
above), this model informs a questionnaire experiment that elicits moral judgments about 
political economy issues under conditions aimed at reflecting real-world differences in roles and 
information. Despite a recent explosion of interest in Smith, this is the first detailed model and 
only thorough empirical analysis based on his impartiality theory. Turning Smith’s thought 
experiment into a laboratory experiment offers numerous advantages, I believe, for addressing a 
number of interesting questions across broad set of important research agenda in political 
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science. First, it offers a means to study impartial morals and the biasing effects of interests that 
figure prominently in public discourse, policy deliberation, political reporting, issue preferences 
and voting. Second, politics is not solely about “is” but also “ought,” and this study belongs to a 
growing research agenda in political science that explores connections between empirical and 
normative analysis. At the most general level, the proposed model of impartiality responds to 
calls for political theory to engage empirical research (e.g., Fung, 2007, and Shapiro, 2002) and 
to contribute to the empirical investigation of ethics, with its meta-ethical implications (e.g., 
Mitchell and Tetlock, 2006). More specifically, though, I apply the proposed method to generate 
evidence on policy preferences in an important and concrete set of policy areas, including the 
environment, health care and welfare. In this analysis, the focus is on two properties that are 
often considered key to normative ethics as well as to the healthy functioning of democratic 
institutions, namely, unbiasedness and consensus. 
 As I argue below, spectator theory has important advantages over alternate theories as a 
framework and inspiration for the empirical analysis of impartiality. Nevertheless, I believe this 
method also complements research on deliberation and public opinion. Thus, although most of 
this paper treats the spectator approach as it pertains to the relationship between empirical 
method and normative theory, this approach also relates and potentially contributes to the study 
of political behavior, public opinion and deliberative democracy, and I will return to these 
connections in the final section of the paper. 
 Impartiality can be construed in different ways, so I begin with a review of the main 
traditions and of the reasons for this paper’s focus on the spectator version. Impartiality is central 
to much of political and moral philosophy, including in some fashion in philosophical systems as 
diverse as those of Kant, Mill and Nozick, but the three dominant traditions are social contract 
theory, discourse theory and impartial spectator theory. Social contractarians include Hobbes, 
Locke and Rousseau, but the best known modern conception of impartiality in this tradition is 
John Rawls’s (1971) original position. The original position is a thought experiment, a 
hypothetical state in which self-interested individuals initially choose the principles that guide 
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the basic structure of society behind a “veil of ignorance” of any particulars about themselves, 
including information about their future position in that society. Rawls held that such a thought 
experiment leads to unanimous agreement on a rule for organizing the basic structure of social 
institutions that he called the “difference principle.” In a series of novel and informative studies, 
Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1992, 1987 with Eavy) conducted experiments designed to 
approximate this kind of impartiality with respect to issues of distributive justice. They found a 
high level of agreement on trade-offs between multiple distribution rules that spans various 
countries and cultures. Whereas the studies of Frohlich and Oppenheimer produced little 
evidence that Rawlsian impartiality leads to Rawls’s distributive principle, Michelbach, Scott, 
Matland and Bornstein (2003) found stronger support for the difference principle but also for the 
importance of trade-offs between multiple principles. 
 The link between moral philosophy and empirical social science is inherent to discourse 
theory (or discourse ethics) as laid out by Jürgen Habermas (1990) [1983]. In this approach, 
impartiality involves establishing certain presuppositions for argumentation among affected 
parties. Thus, Habermas’s principle of impartiality is, at the same time, a principle for 
deliberation among stakeholders, viz., one that specifies the conditions for discourse, including 
equal participation, freedom from constraint, and sincerity. This is summarized in the principle 
of discourse ethics, which states that “only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could 
meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse” 
(1990, pg. 66). Discourse theory has sparked a sizable volume of political science research, 
including on “deliberation theory” and on empirical analysis that seeks to relate deliberation 
theory to practice. This research has been quite varied methodologically. Mansbridge’s seminal 
1980 book, Beyond Adversary Democracy, highlights the challenges to democratic deliberation 
in the case of two small New England communities. The laboratory experiment of Sulkin and 
Simon (2001) indicates that deliberation can create more equitable outcomes and enhance 
fairness perceptions, but these effects depend on the precise implementation. Deliberative polling 
(e.g., Fishkin, 1991) elicits the views of a random sample of the public after they have been 
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exposed to balanced information and an opportunity to participate in discussions guided by 
heterogeneous moderators. List et al. (2007) find that deliberative polls favor a kind of consensus 
(single-peakedness) and that this effect is related to information gains. Neblo (2007) 
experimentally tests the links between deliberation and its effects and finds the results mostly 
consistent with the causality claimed by normative deliberation theory. 
 Impartial spectator (or ideal observer) theory is mostly closely associated with Adam 
Smith, although elements of his approach can be traced to Hutcheson and Hume. In his first 
major work, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (or TMS, 1759), Smith characterized principles or 
conditions for judging right conduct, specifically, these conditions are embodied in an informed, 
sympathetic observer who exists contemporaneously and resides in real people. This impartial 
spectator utilizes his own experiences as well as his faculties of sympathy as a moral arbiter of 
his own conduct and of that of others. The interpretation of Smith’s spectator implemented in the 
current study elicits the views of real people, stresses the unbiasedness of third parties relative to 
stakeholders, and predicts that relevant information helps reduce bias and produce consensus. 
 The recent, resurgent interest in Smith, particularly in TMS, spans philosophy and the 
social sciences. For example, in political science, Griswold (1999) helps initiate more subtle 
interpretations of Smith, Hanley (2008) analyzes Smith on building the political and economic 
institutions of nations, Parrish (2007) sees him as revising moral psychology to make ethical 
problems of markets seem less problematic, and Rasmussen (2006) offers a solution to the 
apparent paradox of Smith’s support for commerce but admission that money does not buy 
happiness. In philosophy, Fleischacker (1999) draws on Smith’s position on liberty, Fricke and 
Schütt (2005) provide an extensive set of contributions based on Smith’s ethics, and Raphael 
(2007) gives a careful interpretation of TMS close to the one proposed here. In economics, 
Ashraf, Camerer and Loewenstein (2005) argue that Smith’s impartial spectator has broad 
implications for modern social science research, Konow (2008) examines claims of consensus 
inspired by Smith’s spectator, and Brown (forthcoming) and Nyborg and Brekke (2007) propose 
a reconciliation of self-interest and moral preferences in a response to the so-called “Adam Smith 
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problem,” which refers to the apparent contradiction between the two. The Haakonssen (2006) 
volume provides an excellent representation of the breadth and depth of interest in Smith across 
political theory, philosophy, economics, history and law. Despite the dramatic multi-disciplinary 
upsurge of research on Smith and TMS, the current study represents, to my knowledge, the first 
thoroughgoing empirical analysis of his impartiality theory, including its examination of the 
incremental effects of relevant and irrelevant information on moral judgment. 
 To clarify, the main purpose of this paper is to specify and test an empirical model of 
spectator impartiality, not to conduct a comparative analysis of possible impartiality theories. 
Nevertheless, it helps clarify and motivate this study to consider differences and similarities 
among these three schools of thought. In theoretical terms, different impartiality ideals can easily 
lead to different optimal rules: for example, a risk loving egalitarian would likely prefer less 
redistribution as a stakeholder behind a veil of ignorance than as a contemporaneous spectator. 
That said, the choice of impartiality concept might still be uninteresting, if the theoretical 
difference is without an empirical distinction, that is, if actual moral judgments do not depend on 
the version of impartiality implemented. The empirical studies, however, of Amiel, Cowell and 
Gaertner (2008), and Traub, Seidl, Schmidt and Levati (2005) establish that different impartiality 
models can produce significantly different moral judgments. I turn, therefore, to a comparison of 
the theories and the contribution of an empirical spectator analysis. 
 First, let us note common ground among the three theories. Habermas, Rawls and Smith 
all associate 1) impartiality with the absence of bias and 2) the satisfaction of the conditions of 
impartiality with consensus. These facts bolster the use on normative grounds of unbiasedness 
and consensus as the two principal criteria in our analysis.1 Discourse theory and spectator 
theory share a number of common features that simultaneously set them apart from Rawls. For 
                                                          
1 Habermas, Rawls and Smith are also universalists, who expect their exercises in impartiality to generate 
general moral rules. This is arguably not a necessary implication of their impartiality theories, since the 
experiments implied by their approaches to impartiality could conceivably produce weak, multiple or 
context dependent rules, or, indeed, no rules at all, and some who follow in their footsteps have moved in 
one or more of these directions. 
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the former, the relevant moral agent exists contemporaneously rather than in a hypothetical prior 
state, he is not solely self-interested but rather can also access a moral sense, he exists not only in 
idealized form but also in real people who seek to engage the positions and perspectives of other 
real people, and no information is denied, even about one’s own station. There are certain 
differences, however, in how Habermas and Smith implement this agent. With Habermas, the 
agent is an implicated party who participates in deliberation with others in order to understand 
their interests and to moderate his own. For Smith, the ideal agent is a third party, who employs 
personal experience and imagination to the same ends. In my view, these differences reflect the 
ethical domains that are foremost in the minds of their architects: Smith’s applications are mostly 
to social interactions and institutions that are on a smaller scale, whereas Habermas focuses on a 
larger scale effects. These differences fit the contexts they originally envisioned.2
 The shared features of spectator and discourse theory give those approaches significant 
practical advantages over contractarian theories for the purposes of empirical analysis: their 
moral arbiters are real, contemporaneous, endowed with a moral sense and not denied 
information about themselves and their experiences. Among theories of impartiality, however, 
spectator theory is unique in adopting a third party perspective, as opposed to that of actual or 
hypothetical stakeholders. Moreover, spectator theory has not previously undergone a detailed 
empirical examination, in contrast to theories in the Rawlsian and Habermasian traditions. The 
spectator approach is, I believe, not only intuitively appealing but also provides a compelling 
method for shedding light on important open questions in political science, including on the role 
of moral views and interests in issue preferences and how to identify balanced information in 
deliberative processes. This is not to suggest, however, that the spectator approach replace other 
methods. Indeed, I believe spectator, deliberation and public opinion research are potentially 
                                                          
2 For example, in deciding how much time I should volunteer for my child’s school or a political 
campaign, objective reflection about uses of my time and the impact of those uses on others has various 
advantages over convening a committee to deliberate the issue. On the other hand, in selecting a tax 
structure, the participation and buy-in of affected parties is potentially important both to constructing and 
to enforcing such a system. 
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complementary and can enhance and strengthen one another in practice. The concluding section 
contains thoughts about this and about other potential contributions of spectator theory. 
 The paper is organized as follows. The following section describes the empirical 
spectator model in general form. The section Design and Procedures presents the specific 
application of the spectator model in this study, which involves a questionnaire-experiment. The 
Results and Analysis section summarizes and analyzes the findings with respect to bias and 
consensus. The final section discusses the results, particularly as they relate to other theoretical 
and empirical work in political science. 
 
THE “QUASI-SPECTATOR” MODEL OF IMPARTIALITY 
This section presents an empirical model of impartiality, including a review of how it takes its 
inspiration from Smith’s TMS and of empirical tests and hypotheses that extend that work. The 
chief contribution of TMS, in my view, is not to ethics (understood broadly as the study of moral 
conduct) but rather more specifically to moral epistemology; that is, this work proposes 
conditions for acquiring moral knowledge. That Smith’s aim was epistemological is suggested 
by the sub-title of TMS: “An essay towards an analysis of the principles by which men naturally 
judge concerning the conduct and character, first of their neighbors, and afterwards of 
themselves.” This sub-title also portends the dual nature of the agent Smith proceeds to develop 
as both observer and participant. The “supposed” or “ideal” spectator is a disinterested (or rather, 
detached) third party, whereas the “real” spectator attempts to apply reflexively the lessons of 
the former: “We endeavour to examine our own conduct as we imagine any other fair and 
impartial spectator would examine it.” Both agents figure prominently in Smith’s writing, and he 
distinguishes degrees of spectatorship from the imperfections of a child or person of weak 
character to the self-command of the ideal spectator. 
 This take on spectatorship also implies a more nuanced view of sympathy in TMS. 
Sympathy involves adopting the positions of others, both cognitively and affectively. I see this as 
serving two functions in Smith, similar to the distinction Rawls (2000) makes in reference to 
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Hume’s spectator. On the one hand, sympathy has an epistemic role that is chiefly of relevance to 
the ideal spectator: it enlarges his awareness of relevant facts by enabling him to factor in the 
experiences and feelings of others in coming to moral judgments. On the other hand, sympathy 
has a motivational function that pertains to the real spectator and helps him to put aside, or at 
least to moderate, his own interests relative to those of others. 
Smith states that the relevant judgments are those of the “impartial and well-informed 
spectator.” This third party is not an unattainable abstraction but rather a state that real people 
can achieve, at least to an approximation. Importantly, this spectator accesses his own life 
experiences: “The man who is conscious to himself that he has exactly observed those measures 
of conduct which experience informs him are generally agreeable, reflects with satisfaction on 
the propriety of his own behaviour.” Nevertheless, his conduct is not motivated by a desire for 
social approbation or by false consciousness, since “he views it in the light in which the impartial 
spectator would view it, … and though mankind should never be acquainted with what he has 
done, he regards himself, not so much according to the light in which they actually regard him, 
as according to that in which they would regard him if they were better informed.” 
 These passages help underscore the emphasis of this study on two qualities of the ideal 
(but not real) spectator. First, the spectator is not and never will be implicated in a situation being 
evaluated, that is, he has no stake, real or perceived, that might bias his judgments of right and 
wrong. Second, the spectator seeks to be fully informed of the relevant particulars and processes 
this information rationally with respect to internalized values. Since the focus here is on the ideal 
spectator, sympathy can be subsumed under this second point in which it serves an epistemic, or 
informational, function. 
 Spectatorship is not merely a philosophical ideal but also a standard we can recognize in 
a variety of social institutions and practices. In the justice system, the selection of juries, the 
assignment of judges and the rules of evidence are designed to approach third party impartiality 
while liberally providing relevant information. Politicians are subject to conflict of interest 
provisions, and an important impetus to campaign reform is to sever legislators from stakes that 
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might bias how they represent the interests of their constituencies. Although its efficacy is 
debatable, government regulation, at least as an ideal, provides informed, third party oversight of 
industries. Sometimes even forces in the private sector attempt to bolster their impartiality 
credentials by supporting informed (ostensibly independent) verification of their practices, such 
as the Better Business Bureau or ClimateCounts.org, a privately supported organization that 
reports the performance of various businesses to limit their greenhouse gas emissions. 
 Of course, the ideal conditions of Smith’s impartial spectator probably never obtain in the 
real world. Information is incomplete, people interject their own interests, and even judgments of 
otherwise objective persons can be tainted by unrepresentative experiences and beliefs. On the 
other hand, the phenomena described above, which reflect the ideal, also demonstrate its 
normative value. Moreover, the approach adopted in the current study explores spectatorship 
under considerably more controlled conditions and with the more focused goals of informing and 
of assisting reflection on theory and policy. Nevertheless, complete information and the utter 
absence of stakes are presumably never both achieved in the real world. Given this, can 
spectatorship be implemented empirically, and, if so, how? 
 The method proposed here seeks to answer the above question by examining the 
judgments of a “quasi-spectator,” whose views are taken as an approximation of those of the 
ideal spectator. The quasi-spectator is a real world observer who evaluates the moral rightness of 
a situation in which he has no salient stakes but about which he is well, albeit probably never 
completely, informed. The proposed method uses conditions designed to elicit and analyze the 
impartial moral preferences of real individuals. The general conditions are quite simple and 
relate to role and information. First, subjects should not be salient stakeholders in the matter they 
are judging, and the elicitation of their preferences should distance them as much as possible 
from their own interests. Thus, the expression of preferences should be separated, to the extent 
possible, from any rewards or sanctions. Ideally, spectator compensation, if utilized, is unrelated 
to decisions they make about others, and spectators are not known personally to or by other 
subjects in order to avoid activating non-ethical (e.g., social approval) motives. Second, 
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information should be carefully chosen so as to provide vital context that allows subjects to 
respond with respect to their moral preferences but with an awareness of the danger of priming 
personal bias. Contextual details can facilitate moral reasoning, as they have been shown to do in 
vignette studies (see, for example, Goldstein and Weber, 1995), but the researcher should avoid, 
or at least control for, specifics that could result in a self-interest bias, e.g., through material 
stakes or vicarious identification with one party over another. 
 These conditions can be implemented in a variety of ways using different empirical 
methods, including with vignettes, attitude surveys and paid laboratory and field experiments.3 
Indeed, many studies across the social sciences (including public opinion surveys) and in 
experimental philosophy have employed quasi-spectators in one form or another. But what 
evidence is there that quasi-spectator views even approximate those of the ideal spectator? What 
distinguishes the current study is its proposal to answer this question by stating and testing 
certain empirical conditions. The quasi-spectator model refers to variation in role and 
information to examine the effects on two properties that have wide appeal on normative and 
empirical grounds: unbiasedness and consensus. This is elaborated below. 
 Absence of bias is universally associated with impartiality. The version of unbiasedness 
adopted here is in the long Aristotelian tradition of virtue as a mean: evidence of quasi-spectator 
unbiasedness is present if their views are a (not necessarily arithmetic) mean of the views of 
stakeholders whose interests are in opposition. On the second property, this study takes seriously 
the claim of most prescriptive theories that ideal impartiality results in unanimity and extends 
this reasoning by arguing that real world impartiality might not produce unanimity, but it should 
result in consensus. Here this is defined as a convergent trend of opinion by quasi-spectators as 
information relevant to their values is added, and, hence, will also be referred to as convergence. 
Thus, in this paper, consensus does not necessarily involve unanimity but rather a higher level of 
                                                          
3 I should note some differences on a matter of terminology as they pertain to the project reported here. 
Since this study involves manipulation of independent variables and random assignment of subjects to 
treatments, most psychologists, sociologists, philosophers and political scientists would characterize it as 
an experiment, but most economists would not, since subjects are not compensated in monetary terms. 
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agreement. The rationale for consensus is that relevant information provides the means for quasi-
spectators to reason from a common set of values and reduces extraneous influences. If 
consensus did not emerge, that would be consistent with some failure of the quasi-spectator 
method, e.g., it could indicate that individuals do not share the same underlying moral views and 
information enables them to judge from these heterogeneous values, or it could indicate 
insurmountable obstacles to practical objectivity, e.g., if information merely feeds self-interested 
biases. Thus, even if one accepts the impartial spectator in principle, there remains this empirical 
claim that any implementation based on it must establish, which the current study addresses. 
 Unbiasedness and consensus enjoy widespread acceptance in the three dominant schools 
of thought about impartiality, but one should acknowledge that there are dissenting views about 
the normative appeal of consensus. Radical pluralists (e.g., Mouffe, 1996) and difference 
democrats (e.g., Young, 1996) oppose consensus, highlighting practical difficulties with 
procedures to achieve consensus and arguing that the good is plural. The finer points of this 
thinking go beyond the scope of this paper, but these critiques have contributed to a shift away 
from unanimity and toward broader concepts, including meta-consensus (Dryzek and Niemeyer, 
2006) and single-peakedness (List et al., 2007). The convergence proposed in this paper also 
represents a broadened concept of consensus, indeed, one that does not require that one abandon 
(or, for that matter, embrace) unanimity as a theoretical ideal. 
 Spectator theory, as formulated in TMS, has certain implications about how role and 
relevant information affect bias and consensus, but it does not address all role/information 
possibilities, e.g., the effects of irrelevant information, so I distinguish below core hypotheses 
from supplemental conjectures. Consider first the four core hypotheses of the quasi-spectator 
model. Note that the term “spectator” will henceforth be used as shorthand for “quasi-spectator,” 
whose views approximate those of ideal spectators, and the term “stakeholder” will refer to an 
individual whose moral views are potentially influenced both by his own stakes in the matter at 
hand as well as by the judgment of the impartial spectator, as with Smith’s “real” spectator. 
H1. Stakeholders are biased, at least in the absence of sufficient relevant information, and 
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spectator judgments are intermediate to opposing stakeholder views. 
At least under low information conditions, stakeholders are biased in the direction of their 
opposing interests and away from impartial views, so spectator judgments are intermediate. 
H2. Relevant information creates consensus among spectators. 
Relevant information permits spectators to judge more accurately from common moral views. 
H3. Relevant information reduces bias among stakeholders. 
Stakeholder views partially reflect the sentiments of spectators. Thus, they should respond to 
relevant information by attraction to the shared, and now more identifiable, moral position. 
H4. Relevant information creates consensus among stakeholders. 
Again, relevant information should have similar effects on stakeholders as spectators, since 
spectators are embedded in stakeholders. 
 Spectator theory does not speak to the potential effects of morally irrelevant information. 
Nevertheless, in the less than ideal circumstances of the real world, both relevant and irrelevant 
information are often present and difficult to disentangle.4 These data, however, allow one to 
explore whether and how different combinations of relevant and irrelevant information affect 
average views and consensus. If relevant and irrelevant information have different effects on bias 
and consensus (e.g., relevant information has desirable effects whereas irrelevant information has 
undesirable effects), that would recommend distinguishing the two types of information, as a 
practical matter. Moreover, these information effects could differ for spectators and stakeholders. 
Theoretical work in philosophy (e.g., Rawls, 1971) as well as empirical social science research 
(e.g., Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997, Dunning, Meyerowitz and Holzberg, 1989) suggest that 
information provides the raw material for stakeholder bias. On the other hand, information that 
increases spectator consensus might do so for stakeholders, as well. Spectator theory does not 
address these important questions, but I propose two conjectures, H5 and H6, about them. Since 
arguments regarding the effects of irrelevant information go both ways, the null hypothesis is 
                                                          
4 For now, the distinction between relevant and irrelevant information is not explicitly defined. In the 
following section, however, more precise definitions will be stated in the context of this study. 
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that irrelevant information has no effect, regardless of presence of relevant information. 
H5. Irrelevant information does not significantly affect the moral views of stakeholders, whether 
or not it appears in combination with relevant information. 
This conjecture is silent about spectators for reasons explained in the following section. 
H6. Irrelevant information does not significantly affect spectator or stakeholder consensus, 
whether or not it appears in combination with relevant information. 
 Having laid out the quasi-spectator model of impartiality in general terms, we now turn in 
the following section to the specifics of how it is implemented in the current study. 
 
DESIGN AND PROCEDURES 
This study employs questionnaires that ask respondents to allocate fixed resources in six 
hypothetical scenarios (or vignettes) under different conditions with respect to their role 
(stakeholder, spectator) and available information (base, relevant, irrelevant). Many previous 
studies of moral intuition have employed contrasting versions of scenarios (e.g., Kahneman, 
Knetsch and Thaler, 1986), but the quasi-spectator model requires examining the incremental 
effects of information on moral judgment, which only a few studies, such as Faravelli (2007) and 
Konow (2008), have utilized. Moreover, the latter two studies involved only two conditions per 
scenario, as opposed to the current study, which employs twelve conditions per scenario and is 
unique, to my knowledge, in considering the effects of role and the quantity of relevant and 
irrelevant information on bias and consensus. 
 The goals in designing the study were to elicit thoughtful and explicitly moral judgments 
to situations in which information is carefully controlled. Moreover, the design is unusually 
ambitious for studies of this kind with 72 total treatments (six scenarios and twelve 
role/information conditions per scenario). These facts informed the choices regarding method 
and subject pool.5 A comparatively large number of observations was needed given various 
                                                          
5 The basic empirical method and subject pool for this study correspond to the practice in many political 
science experiments and in almost all studies in the field of experimental philosophy (see, for example, 
Knobe 2007, Nadelhoffer and Nahmias 2007, and Nichols 2004), including what Mitchell and Tetlock 
(2006) call experimental political philosophy. 
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considerations, including the numerous versions of each question, the fact that individual subject 
questionnaires did not usually contain the full complement of scenarios, the collection of a 
minimum of 50 observations for each version of every question (and frequently more than 100), 
and the use of a between subjects design for role and information. These facts alone necessitated 
more than 1000 subjects, but, in addition, revisions to vignettes involved multiple waves that 
brought the actual total number of subjects to 1383. Participants, therefore, were drawn from 
undergraduate students enrolled in social science classes at a comprehensive US university who 
participated in order to complete a course requirement. Although the subjects were 
disproportionately lower classmen, they were otherwise quite representative of students at this 
demographically diverse institution, as illustrated in Table A1 of the Appendix.6
 
TABLE 1. Summary of Contexts and Vignettes 
 
Question Ethics Field/Subject  Policy Area 
      1  Environmental ethics  Environmental protection 
      2  Law and ethics  Tort law 
      3  Bioethics   Health care 
      4  Accountability principle Labor compensation 
      5  Need principle   Welfare 
      6  Efficiency principle  Industrial restructuring 
 
 
 The six scenarios in the questionnaire are classified in Table 1 according to the ethics 
field or subject they reference and the particular policy area they address. All scenarios involve 
economic policies or issues with significant economic content for two reasons: on the one hand, 
the design requires quantitative dependent variables, and, on the other hand, recent research 
underscores the importance of such issues for public opinion and political behavior 
(Ansolabehere et al., 2006, 2008). Questions 1 through 3 deal with fields in applied ethics, 
                                                          
6 To the extent this sample differs from the more general population, that is probably not critical to this 
study, since its focus is not on subject views per se but rather on the relative effects of allocator role and 
information on those views, and there is no obvious reason why or evidence that these effects would be 
specific to any group (indeed, see Tables A4 to A6 of the Appendix demonstrate the almost universal 
insignificance of demographic variables for subject responses). The data were collected from November 
2003 to April 2006. 
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whereas questions 4 through 6 are designed to represent contexts in which a single distributive 
principle is salient using the justice framework proposed in Konow (2003). Specifically, question 
1 concerns the amount by which the EPA should require a pulp mill to reduce the waste it 
discharges into a river in light of the consequences for workers at the mill as well as those who 
live near the river. Question 2 asks how much the court should award the victim of a vehicular 
accident considering the damages and responsibilities of the two parties.7 Question 3 asks how 
the limited budget of a hospital should be allocated given the need to provide both emergency 
services and preventative services to the local community. Question 4 addresses worker 
compensation when the salient fairness concern is accountability (Konow, 2000), i.e., rewarding 
agents in proportion to the contributions they control (here work hours). Question 5 focuses on 
need-based government support for a student trying to complete a high school diploma. Question 
6 concerns the efficient use of limited investment funds to accommodate industrial restructuring 
given changes in technology and industry demand. 
 
TABLE 2. Experimental Design and Treatment Acronyms 
 
     Information condition 
 
                Base+    Base+Relevant 
Allocator role          Base   Base+Relevant     Irrelevant      +Irrelevant 
Spectator  S  SR  SI  SRI 
High stakeholder H  HR  HI  HRI 
Low stakeholder L  LR  LI  LRI 
 
 
 There are twelve versions of each of the six questions, which vary according to the 
information provided and the role into which the respondent is cast. This is illustrated in Table 2. 
Respondents are instructed to select the amount they think “should” be allocated to some party or 
purpose, where permissible choices are on a closed interval that, for ease of comparison across 
questions, runs from zero to a power of ten (i.e., 10, 100, 1000, etc.). For each question, a 
respondent allocates from one of three possible hypothetical roles: an uninvolved third party or 
                                                          
7 This scenario is closely modeled on the case used in a series of studies reported in Babcock and 
Loewenstein (1997). I wish to thank Linda Babcock for kindly sharing their materials. 
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Spectator, a person who benefits directly or by association from having an amount that lies on 
the lower (i.e., zero) end of the allocation interval or Low Stakeholder, or a person who prefers 
an amount that lies on the upper end of the allocation interval or High Stakeholder. Note that 
Low and High do not mean small and large stakes, respectively, but rather indicate the direction 
of preference along the interval. For example, in question 1, the Spectator is told the pulp mill is 
in a different region of the country so as to lessen any projected concern for one’s own 
employment or exposure to pollution, the High Stakeholder (who wants a large reduction in 
emissions) lives near the mill, and the Low Stakeholder (who wants a small reduction in 
emissions) commutes from elsewhere to work at the mill. These three roles are crossed with four 
information conditions: the Base information, which is identical in all conditions, the Base plus 
Relevant information, the Base plus Irrelevant information, and the Base plus both Relevant and 
Irrelevant information. Table 2 also lists the acronyms that are used for these treatments. Thus, 
there are 72 conditions in this six Scenario (questions 1–6) × three Allocator role (S, H, L) × four 
Information condition (Base, R, I, R+I) factorial design. All subjects responded to more than one 
scenario, but the role and information conditions were between subjects: no respondent read 
more than one of the twelve versions of each question. The text of the twelve versions of the six 
questions can be found in composite form in the Appendix. 
 Although it is usually obvious whether a role in these contexts is that of a Spectator (S), 
High Stakeholder (H) or Low Stakeholder (L), it is less clear whether information is morally 
Relevant or Irrelevant or what those terms should mean. I chose an empirical definition for these 
concepts inspired by spectator theory. Information is considered morally Relevant (R) if it causes 
a statistically significant shift in the mean judgment of spectators when added to their base 
information (i.e., the means of S and SR differ). For example, for question 1, information about 
the consequences of different levels of pollution reduction on nearby residents and on workers at 
the pulp mill is relevant. Information is deemed morally Irrelevant (I) if, when added to R 
information, it does not produce a statistically significant shift in mean judgments of spectators 
(i.e., the means of SR and SRI do not differ). For example, for question 1, information about the 
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opposing positions of the labor union and local homeowners’ association is irrelevant. That is, R 
information causes impartial third parties to change their moral views, whereas I information 
does not. To create substantial separation between these two types of information, in this study 
information must cause a shift in means at the 0.1% level of significance to be considered R and 
must produce no difference in means even at the 10% level of significance to be considered I. 
Although the content of most scenarios was chosen ex ante, identifying passages that qualified as 
R or I according to these criteria sometimes involved revision of content. Since statistical criteria 
are used to define and identify R and I, statistically testing differences based on such information 
might seem circular, but that is not so: these difference in means tests of R and I help establish 
independent variables, but the hypotheses to be tested employ a different set of dependent 
variables on bias and consensus, to which we now turn.8
 Bias is measured in this study by comparing mean decisions under different conditions. If 
the manipulation is effective, under low information conditions the mean H view should exceed 
the mean L view, whereas unbiased spectator views will lie between these opposing stakeholder 
views (H1). Consensus is identified by comparing variances in views and is associated with a 
decrease in variance across conditions, e.g., with the addition of R (H2 and H4). It should be 
noted that, in the vignettes presented in this study, the first two moments of the distribution of 
views can be used to address bias and consensus. It is not, however, the general claim of the 
quasi-spectator model that these two metrics are always the correct ones for these purposes.9
 Numerous measures were undertaken to achieve good survey design. In order to promote 
respondent attentiveness, subjects never answered more than six questions and often answered 
fewer, depending in part on the overall length of their questionnaires. For similar reasons, long 
                                                          
8 This is the reason spectators are not addressed in H5 in the prior section: their moral views are used for 
identifying R and I. 
9 For example, suppose all spectators agree completely on a rule that allocates rewards, y, as a function, 
f(x), of individual trait x, but different spectators observe individuals with different values of trait x. Then, 
the ideal distribution of judgments is not degenerate. Unbiasedness means here that the expected 
deviation of y from its ideal (given x) is zero, while consensus means lower variance of judgments 
controlling for morally relevant parameters such as x. 
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versions of questions were generally balanced with short versions of other questions. Simple and 
clear instructions directed subjects to choose the allocation they thought “should” be enacted in 
each scenario, i.e., even stakeholders were asked to choose the morally right allocation. To 
address possible order effects, a randomized Latin square design was adopted, i.e., versions of 
questions were randomly assigned to a variety of different orders. Demographic data were 
collected from subjects on age, gender, race, and a variety of academic and economic variables. 
 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 The presentation and analysis of the results in this section focus on comparisons of means 
and variances between different allocator role and information conditions. In order to facilitate 
comparisons across different questions, the responses have been converted, where necessary, to a 
common 0 to 100 scale (dividing by 1000 for question 2, dividing by 10 for question 5 and 
multiplying by 10 for question 6). Table A2 in the Appendix reports the results of tests that 
confirm that the information used in the questions comply with the criteria defined for them. 
Specifically, according to two-tail t-tests of differences in mean judgments, R information, when 
added to the Base, causes a shift in the mean judgments of S that is significant at the 0.1% level, 
whereas I information, when added to R, produces no difference in judgments that is significant 
at the 10% level (indeed, there is only one such shift that is significant even at the 20% level). 
 Figure 1 summarizes the mean responses by allocator role for each of the six questions 
under the Base information condition with bars, while the 95% confidence intervals are indicated 
with lines. The mean judgments of H always exceed those of L, indeed, these differences are 
significant at the 1% level, except for question 3 where p=.07 (one-tail t-tests). This systematic 
pattern of bias is particularly striking, in light of the fact that even stakeholders were asked to 
provide their moral preferences (what they think should be implemented), which one would 
expect to be less biased than their personal preferences (what they prefer to see enacted). In 
addition, the mean Spectator responses consistently lie between the means of their respective H 
and L responses for all questions. These results corroborate the effectiveness of the manipulation 
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of roles and are consistent with the predictions of H1. 
 





















 1. Envir.                 2. Law            3. Healthcare          4. Labor            5. Welfare         6. Ind. restr.
Note: Lines indicate the boundaries of the 95% confidence intervals.
 
 
 What are the effects of relevant and irrelevant information on stakeholder bias? Figure 2 
illustrates average stakeholder bias under the four information conditions, where bias is 
measured as the difference between responses of high and low stakeholders. The white bars 
represent the unweighted mean bias across the six questions, where # indicates bias is significant 
for 3-4 questions and ## for 5-6 questions. The dark bars are the estimated effects from a 
regression of average bias for each of the six questions and four information conditions on 
dummy variables for the questions and information conditions, where question 1 and R are the 
omitted categories (see column (1) of Table A3 in the Appendix). As is apparent, both measures 
suggest quantitatively similar effects. With only Base information, there is, on average, 
approximately a 14 point stakeholder bias. When relevant information is added, this bias is 
reduced to insignificance, strongly supporting H3. Interestingly, irrelevant information alone 
also reduces bias in comparison to the Base condition (F-statistic=6.17, p=.03), but not to 
insignificance (t-statistic=2.30, p=.04). Even more interesting, perhaps, is the fact that bias 
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equals roughly the same 8 percentage points with I as with both R and I: in the latter case, bias is 
also significantly lower than in the Base condition (F-statistic=5.19, p=.04) but significantly 
greater than zero (t-statistic=2.50, p=.02). Thus, these results refute the conjecture H5 that 
irrelevant information has no effect on bias and have more subtle implications: both R and I 
information reduce bias, but eliminating significant stakeholder bias altogether involves 
providing R while withholding I. 
 
Figure 2. Stakeholder Bias 
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indicates that 3-4/5-6 of the six questions differ significantly from zero at the 5% level; */** means 




 Table 3 summarizes the results of regression analyses that break down the effects of 
information on moral judgments by allocator role and scenario. These regressions also include 
controls for the personal characteristics of gender, race, major, class, age, expenditures, parents’ 
income, hours worked and earnings, which are reported in the Appendix. This analysis allows us 
to examine the information effects by question and allocator role, to address the significance of R 
and I controlling for personal characteristics, and to explore possible effects of personal 
characteristics that might reflect personal bias. Relevant information (R and R+I) drives 
judgments significantly and in the same direction for spectators and stakeholders in 97% of the 
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cases (all 36 cases except R for L on question 6). Five of the I dummies are now significant, but 
the effects of I remain smaller in magnitude than those of R (with one exception) and, controlling 
for personal characteristics, remain insignificant in 72% of the cases. The effects of the eleven 
personal characteristics are mostly small in magnitude and usually not significant: only 6% 
(twelve) of these 198 coefficients (eleven variables for three allocator roles and six questions) are 
significant at conventional levels, roughly the percentage one would expect by chance (see 
Tables A4 to A6 in the Appendix). 
 
TABLE 3. Regression Analysis: Moral Judgments of Spectators and Stakeholders 
 
       Question 
Regressors    1. Environ. 2. Law        3. Bioethics      4. Accountab.         5. Need         6. Efficiency 
 
Spectators 
Relevant 18.96** −21.71** 14.14** 13.37** 32.95** −12.07** 
Relev+Irrelev 16.63** −17.38** 14.18** 12.23** 27.87** −10.51** 
Irrelevant 6.97^  0.62  −2.21  −1.30  9.31*  −8.13** 
 
Observations 309  332  314  327  310  324 
R-squared 0.15  0.13  0.25  0.59  0.31  0.13 
 
High stakeholders 
Relevant 10.37*  −35.59** 9.97**  10.64** 14.14** −14.91** 
Relev+Irrelev 12.10** −27.00** 15.69** 9.60**  7.82*  −15.33** 
Irrelevant 0.17  12.69*  −0.52  0.85  −6.15  −8.00* 
 
Observations 225  219  226  223  221  223 
R-squared 0.13  0.12  0.22  0.33  0.16  0.24 
 
Low stakeholders 
Relevant 19.34** −15.43** 16.71** 10.27** 32.40** 1.06 
Relev+Irrelev 16.71** −15.88** 13.53** 9.50**  23.06** −11.68** 
Irrelevant 5.87  16.08** −0.01  −0.35  8.73^  −0.02 
 
Observations 224  216  238  220  215  227 
R-squared 0.11  0.28  0.25  0.21  0.26  0.14 
 
Note: The entries are regression coefficients. The full results of these regressions are reported in the 
Appendix and include controls for gender, race, major, class, age, expenditures, parents’ income, hours 
worked and earnings. 
^p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01 (two-tailed) 
 
 Turning now to the matter of consensus, Figure 3 presents the results of a regression of 
variance on allocator roles and information conditions, controlling for questions (see column (2) 
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of Table A3 in the Appendix). The bars represent the estimated variance under different role and 
information conditions, where asterisks indicate the significance of differences in the respective 
regression coefficients from the Base Stakeholder condition (stakeholders include both H and L). 
What stands out is that estimated variance is consistently lower with R than without R, indeed, 
by more than 40%, on average. Given the presence (or absence) of R, variance does not differ 
with allocator role or I information even at the 40% level of significance, but all conditions with 
R differ from all conditions without R at the 5% level (see Table A7 in the Appendix). Thus, 
relevant information is decisive: it reduces variance significantly and by a similar magnitude that 
does not depend on whether or not irrelevant information is present. Irrelevant information does 
not significantly affect variance. These results corroborate all predictions about consensus: 
relevant information creates consensus among spectators (H2) and stakeholders (H4), and 
irrelevant information does not significantly affect spectator or stakeholder consensus (H6). 
 

























Notes: */** indicates that the estimated variance differs at the 5%/1% level of signif icance from that in the 
Base Stakeholder condition (tw o-tail t-tests).
              Base            Relevant         Irrelevant     Relev + Irrel         Base            Relevant        Irrelevant      Relev + Irrel  











DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 This paper proposes a model of spectator impartiality inspired by Smith, tests it 
 22
empirically, and finds significant support for its core hypotheses (H1 to H4) and interesting 
results on two related conjectures (H5 and H6). In the absence of relevant information, 
stakeholders are biased (H1), but relevant information reduces this bias (H3). Irrelevant 
information also reduces bias (contrary to H5), but eliminating bias appears to involve providing 
relevant information without irrelevant information. Relevant information creates consensus 
(reduces variance) among spectators (H2) and stakeholders (H4), whereas irrelevant information 
does not significantly impact spectator or stakeholder consensus (consistent with H6). I conclude 
with some reflections on spectator theory and how it might complement future work on 
deliberation, public opinion and political behavior. 
 The ideal spectator described in Smith’s TMS need only introspect to know what is right, 
since such agents have shared values that lead to the same conclusions. A practical weakness of 
this approach is its reliance on a single agent: even if the presupposition of shared values is 
correct, one cannot expect the real world to display the conditions necessary for unanimous, 
unbiased judgments. The quasi-spectator model addresses this by accessing the moral intuitions 
of multiple individuals and by a broader concept of consensus, similar to developments in 
deliberation theory. It takes unbiasedness and consensus as necessary and sufficient conditions 
for impartiality. As critics of consensus point out, consensus is not desirable if there is bias. For 
instance, consensus is normatively suspect, if it is achieved through coercion by the more 
powerful, conformity due to differing skills of persuasion, framing effects or false consciousness. 
Similarly, the value of unbiasedness depends, in this framework, on some level of consensus. In 
instrumental terms, moral views that are unbiased but more dispersed can contribute to higher 
rates of dispute that prove costly to all parties, consistent with experimental results on dispersion 
and bargaining (e.g., Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997). In intrinsic terms, consensus is a logical 
consequence of unbiasedness itself for universalists like Habermas, Rawls, Smith and their 
followers. 
 I believe the empirical methods of deliberation, public opinion and the quasi-spectator 
provide lessons that can prove mutually beneficial, including for the analysis of political 
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behavior. Deliberative polling, such as Fishkin and Luskin (2005), treats the benefits of 
combining the first two methods, and Barabas (2004) proposes a theory of how deliberation 
increases knowledge and alters opinions, building in large part on public opinion research, 
especially Zaller and Feldman (1992). I will focus on the other two combinations of methods. 
 Public opinion research typically involves mass surveys on policy issues whereas the 
quasi-spectator method specifies general conditions for eliciting moral preferences, which can 
include surveys or other methods. Their intersection constitutes large sample surveys that 
explore moral preferences over public sector issues with an awareness of role and/or information 
conditions. A nice example along these lines is Gibson’s study (2008), which embeds an 
experimental vignette in a representative survey to examine perceptions of judicial impartiality. 
Within this research area, the quasi-spectator method suggests possible measures to implement 
impartiality and evaluate bias. For example, respondents might be asked for moral preferences 
(what policies they think should be enacted) as well as personal preferences (what policies they 
prefer). Bias can further be studied by tracking variables related to participant stakes in the issues 
they are judging, and perhaps by consciously selecting respondents for their second party or third 
party status. Public opinion research, in turn, provides a wealth of lessons for quasi-spectator 
studies that use surveys, including about subject pool selection, salience, order effects, wording 
effects, framing effects, interviewer effects, reference group effects, consistency, and reliability. 
 This study has focused chiefly on the normative value of identifying impartial moral 
judgments and stakeholder biases, but recent findings also suggest possible benefits of the 
spectator method for descriptive research on political behavior. Ansolabehere, Rodden and 
Snyder (2006, 2008) identify well behaved issue preferences that have significant explanatory 
power for voting behavior and find that, even on economic issues, a large part of the variance in 
these preferences cannot be traced to self-interest.10 They conclude that understanding beliefs 
                                                          
10 I should note an important difference in the use of the term “moral.” In the Ansolabehere et al. articles, 
“moral” issues include views of abortion, gay rights, religion and school prayer, as opposed to economic 
issues, which include views on the desirable scale of government and its involvement in the economy. In 
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about what is right or fair is a difficult but also key question, since these are an important 
determinant of voting behavior (2006). The quasi-spectator method offers a means for eliciting 
such beliefs; this, in turn, can enable efforts to construct theories of beliefs about what policies 
are right or fair (e.g., Konow, 2003). One might also reduce unexplained variance in political 
preferences and behavior by identifying individual differences in trade-offs between self-interest 
and different moral preferences. In incentivized experiments, Fowler and Kam (2007) find that 
political participation is predicted by individual willingness to deviate from self-interest and act 
on altruistic preferences, and Dawes and Fowler (2007) establish further patterns in political 
participation based on individual differences in utilitarian versus Rawlsian moral preferences. 
Adding spectator treatments might help better identify moral preferences and explain stakeholder 
behavior, e.g., in Konow (2000), spectator decisions provided more precise measures of moral 
preferences and, in conjunction with stakeholder treatments, identified not only the impact of 
self-interest but also decomposed it into unadulterated (i.e., acknowledged) self-interest and self-
deception (i.e., self-serving beliefs about what is right). One could similarly conduct experiments 
and surveys using spectators to disentangle and, thereby, better explain and predict the sources 
and effects of moral preferences on public opinion and political behavior. 
 There are various opportunities, in my mind, for empirical research on deliberative 
democracy and the quasi-spectator to enhance one another. For example, the quasi-spectator 
method offers a standard for calibrating the degree of impartiality present in the processes and 
outcomes of deliberation. As previously discussed, critics of deliberative democracy often 
question whether it will generate unbiased results, even if it produces consensus. Deliberative 
research typically adopts explicit steps to promote impartial discourse, e.g., by employing 
impartial moderators, providing balanced information and encouraging participants to remain 
open-minded. Indeed, some claim that balanced information is also a product of ideal 
deliberation. Be that as it may, the question remains whether there is an independent measure of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the current paper, “moral” refers not to what individuals prefer but rather to what they think should be, 
and not only with respect to questions like abortion but also on issues like the scale of government. 
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impartiality that could be employed to corroborate and perhaps improve the desired balance. 
Spectatorship offers such a standard, for example, individuals from outside a local community 
might be brought into a conflict over municipal planning, such as that described in Karpowitz 
and Mansbridge (2005), to hear the arguments of the stakeholders and to provide input on a fair 
resolution and, simultaneously, to help identify bias in different proposals. This application is to 
outcomes, but informed third parties could also be used to operate on the deliberative process. 
For instance, experiments on deliberation typically seek to provide balanced information, and 
informed third parties might help identify what information is genuinely balanced and impartial. 
 One outcome often expected from deliberation is opinion change, and this also represents 
an important area of overlapping research between deliberative democracy and public opinion. 
Nevertheless, deliberation sometimes does not produce significant opinion change and, in any 
case, critics question whether such change has normative value (e.g., if it is coerced). One 
possibility for addressing these questions is to engage third parties, perhaps parallel to 
stakeholders, in deliberation and gauge their opinions before and after. Since they are not 
stakeholders, any transformation in their views should not be due to coercion. In addition, such 
comparisons might also help clarify whether any absence of opinion change is due to a failure in 
stakeholder deliberation or, perhaps, to the fact that initial opinions were already unbiased. 
 Empirical deliberation research can also inform and strengthen quasi-spectator studies, 
particularly, I think, with respect to the epistemic aspects of impartiality. Stakes are often 
directly correlated with information about many factors that one expects to be relevant to 
arriving at impartial decisions. Stakeholders presumably know better what issues are most 
important and what arguments most salient to them. Sometimes they also possess more facts 
about the workings of the relevant people and institutions and how they might be affected by 
policies under consideration. Moreover, one of the virtues of deliberation heralded by its 
advocates is that the process itself helps to produce more thoughtful and informed views. One 
might, therefore, elicit the views of third parties who observe, and perhaps even participate in, 
deliberations with stakeholders in order better to understand and appreciate contextual factors. 
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 Third parties might, in turn, be employed for epistemic purposes to improve deliberation. 
The results reported in this study indicate that sorting information into its relevant and irrelevant 
components using quasi-spectators offers opportunities for significant improvements in terms of 
unbiasedness and consensus among stakeholders. One proposal to reduce bias and dispute rates 
is to utilize quasi-spectators to identify the relevance of arguments advanced by one group of 
stakeholders and then to expose another group of stakeholders, who engage in deliberation, only 
to the relevant arguments. 
 The empirical methods inspired by spectator theory and deliberation theory have different 
relative benefits. It seems advisable, therefore, to make the choice of method, or combination of 
methods, reflect these context- and goal-dependent trade-offs. I argued here, for example, that 
the goal of spectator theory relates more to moral epistemology, including the search for the 
principles of ethics. Implementations of deliberation theory, on the other hand, have typically 
emphasized more contextually rich policy questions. The advantages of eliciting the views of 
disinterested parties are more salient in the former case, whereas the importance of parties being 
vested in understanding and grappling with complex issues is apparent in the latter case. This 
diversity of goals and contexts justifies, I believe, a variety of empirical methods, and a possible 
area for future work is to explore how different combinations of the quasi-spectator method, 
public opinion research and deliberation research might strengthen work on empirically informed 
ethics, public policy, policy preferences and voting.
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Key to Composite Questions 
The text assigning allocator roles appears in [brackets] with H for High Stakeholder, L for Low 
Stakeholder and S for Spectator (where no S appears, there is no additional text for this role and the 
Spectator is by default). Text related to information conditions appears in {braces}, where R denotes 
Relevant information, I denotes Irrelevant information, and the remaining text is the Base information 
that is found in all versions. 
 
Instructions 
 This questionnaire consists of several questions each describing a different scenario. Please read 
each question carefully, and then supply a numerical answer in the space provided. Please give exactly 
one answer to every question, as we cannot use forms with multiple or incomplete answers. This is not a 
test of knowledge or ability. Instead, we are interested in what you think should be done in each scenario 
given the information provided. 
 After you complete the questions, there is a final page requesting subject information. When you 
are finished, please put your form and pencil down and wait quietly. When everyone is finished you will 
individually and confidentially deposit your forms in the box in the front. 
 
1. The Environmental Protection Agency (or EPA) is responsible for regulating the discharge of 
degradable waste by a pulp mill into a river. [S: The pulp mill involved is located in a different region of 
the country. / H: You live in a house, built by your great-grandfather, that is located near this river 
downstream from the pulp mill. / L: Suppose you and others commute from a neighboring county to work 
at this pulp mill, since there is no other industry or major employer in this region. You are the sole 
provider for yourself, your infant children and your elderly parents.] The EPA must decide whether to 
require the pulp mill to reduce its waste discharges into the river and, if so, by how much. Doing so would 
reduce various adverse effects of the discharge, but complying with EPA requirements would also require 
the pulp mill to cut its labor force of 400 workers and, perhaps, to close down altogether. {R: Cutting the 
waste by 30% would eliminate the noxious odors coming from the river but would result in the 
unemployment of 10 workers at the pulp mill. Cutting the waste by 60% would also make the river safe 
for drinking, swimming and fishing, but would cause a total of 20 workers to be laid off. Eliminating the 
waste altogether (that is, reducing it by 100%) would allow the return of an additional type of fish valued 
by some sports fishermen but would make the pulp mill unprofitable so that it would have to close down 
and lay off all 400 of its workers.} {I: The local labor union opposes any regulation of the pulp mill. The 
local homeowners’ association is campaigning to have the discharges eliminated altogether.} By how 
much, if any, do you think the EPA should require the pulp mill to reduce its discharges (Enter a number 
from 0% for “no reduction” to 100% for “complete elimination” in the space below)? 
  ______ % 
 
2. [S: You are the judge deciding the outcome of a civil suit brought by a motorcyclist against the driver 
of a car that hit him. / H: You have brought a civil suit against the driver of a car that hit you while you 
were on your motorcycle. / L: While driving your car, you hit a motorcycle, and that motorcyclist has 
brought a civil suit against you.] The suit demands $100,000 in damages for medical expenses, loss of 
earnings and pain and suffering (vehicle repairs were covered by insurance), but the actual award could 
be anything between $0 and $100,000. In court testimony, the facts have been presented as follows. The 
motorcyclist pulled out of a parking lot into a street a few feet from a stop sign and was thrown from his 
motorcycle when the car struck him. {R: As a result of the accident, the motorcyclist has lost earnings of 
about $3,000 due to missed work time and has incurred medical expenses of around $12,000.} {I: A 
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passenger in the car claims the motorcycle pulled in front of the car, but a bystander denies this and says 
that the car was speeding.} How much do you think the court should require [S,H: driver of the car / L: 
you] to pay the [S,L: motorcyclist / H: you] (Enter a number from $0 to $100,000)? 
  $ ___________ 
 
3. [H: Suppose that you rely exclusively on the local hospital’s preventative services since your job does 
not provide health insurance or enough income for you to buy insurance on your own. These preventative 
services include screening that enabled you to treat tuberculosis before it became life threatening and, for 
your child, immunizations and medication to control her diabetes. / L: Suppose you frequently rely on the 
local hospital’s emergency room when your child experiences life-threatening asthma attacks.] A hospital 
budget committee must decide how much of the budget it controls to allocate to the hospital’s emergency 
services versus to its preventive services for the community. {R: At present, many patients in the 
community go to the emergency room for their non-emergency needs because they are uninsured. By 
increasing the budget to preventative services to 60%, the needs of these patients would be covered, and 
the reduced burden on emergency services would allow it to provide almost the same level of services as 
previously.} {I: Currently, patients seeking preventative services must schedule appointments six months 
or more in advance.} What percentage of the budget do you think should be allocated to preventative 
services (Enter a number from 0% to 100% in the space below)? 
  ______ % 
 
4. Suppose [S: Adam and Bill / H: you and Bill / L: you and Adam] worked last weekend stuffing 
envelopes for a mass mailing. This job took a total of 11 man hours, but [S,L: Adam / H: you] worked 
more hours than [S,H: Bill / L: you]. {R: Specifically, [H: you / S,L: Adam] worked 8 hours whereas 
[S,H: Bill / L: you] worked 3 hours.} {I: To get to the job, [H: you / S,L: Adam] drove two hours and 
[S,H: Bill / L: you] took a one hour bus ride.} The total pay for this 11 hour job is $100. How much of 
this $100 do you think [S: Adam and Bill / H: you and Bill / L: you and Adam] should each receive 
(Enter amounts for each person below and make sure the two amounts total $100)? 
  [S: Adam / H,L: You]            $    S  H  
  [S,H: Bill / L: Adam]          $      L  
  Total                 $100 
 
5. [H: Suppose that you recently lost both parents but that, with the help of financial assistance you have 
received from the state, you just finished school at the top of your class. / L: Suppose that, having worked 
your way through school, you are now work long hours at a challenging but modestly paid job at a bank.] 
The state provides support to those in need for a limited period of time. For example, John, who needs 
one year to complete a high school diploma, is eligible to receive such support. {R: The state has 
determined that the basic needs of a person living in this area for food, housing and clothing equal $800 
per month.} {I: Because of a downturn in the economy, tax revenues have fallen and the number of 
people applying for support from the state has increased.} How much do you think the state should 
provide in total support for John per month (Enter a number from $0 to $1000)? 
  $ ________ per month 
 
6. A large company has two divisions. The one division produces film for traditional cameras, which is 
the business the company was founded on. The other, newer division is focused on technologies for 
digital photography and printing. [H: Suppose your only employable skills are in the film division, where 
you have worked for 25 years. You are eligible for retirement benefits in 3 years, which you will lose if 
the film division is scaled back and you are laid off. / L: Suppose that when you saw the move toward 
digital technologies, you went back to college at your own cost to acquire computer skills and are now 
employed in the digital division.] Due to changing consumer demand, the traditional film division is on 
the decline and its share of company revenues is falling. The company’s budget for plant, machinery and 
equipment in the coming year totals $10 billion, and its board must decide how much of this to devote to 
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the film division and how much to the digital division. {R: Company finance analysts expect revenues 
from the film division to fall from 60% currently to only 10% in five years. In order to protect the 
company’s financial health and survival, they recommend focusing expenditures for plant, machinery and 
equipment on the digital division and devoting $9 billion of next year’s budget to the digital division and 
only $1 billion to the film division.} {I: Efficiency in the film division could be improved slightly by 
minor expenditures on tools, but its plant, machinery and equipment are otherwise up-to-date.} How 
much of this $10 billion do you think the board should budget for the film division of the company (Enter 
a number in billions of dollars from 0 to 10)? 
  $ _______ billion 
 
Subject information 
Please answer all questions, indicating just one answer per question, as we cannot use forms with 
incomplete or multiple answers. 
 
1. What is your college? 
1 Business          3 Liberal Arts 
2 Communications and Fine Arts        4 Science and Engineering 
 
2. What is your first major (if undeclared, write UD)? 
_______________________________ 
 
3. What year in college are you? 
1 Freshman          3 Junior 
2 Sophomore          4 Senior 
            5 Graduate 
 
4. What is your age? 
________ years 
 
5. What is your gender? 
1 Male           2 Female 
 
6. What is your ethnicity (if several apply, please choose the one that you consider most accurate)? 
1 Asian/Pacific-Islander         4 Latino/Hispanic 
2 Black/African-American        5 Middle-Eastern 
3 Caucasian          6 Native-American/American Indian 
 
7. What is your best estimate of your total expenditures this school year (September through May)? 
Please consider all expenses including tuition, housing, food, clothing, transportation, entertainment, etc., 
even if some are covered by financial aid or grants. 
$______________ for the current school year (September through May) 
 
8. What is the total (gross) income last year of your parents or guardians (or spouse, if married)? Exclude 
your own earnings. Please choose a single response, even if it is a guess. 
1 $0 to less than $25,000         5 $100,000 to less than $125,000 
2 $25,000 to less than $50,000        6 $125,000 to less than $150,000 
3 $50,000 to less than $75,000        7 $150,000 or more 
4 $75,000 to less than $100,000  
 
9. How many hours per week do you usually work (Enter 0 if none)? 
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________ hours per week 
 






TABLE A1. Demographic Characteristics of the 
   Sample and the Population 
 
Characteristic          Sample      Population 
 
Ethnicity    %  % 
Asian/Pacific-Islander   11  11 
Black/African-American   7  7 
Caucasian    61  54 
Latino/Hispanic   18  18 
Other/Decline to State   3  10 
Gender 
Female    63  60 
Male     37  40 
College 
Liberal Arts    38  37 
Communications and Fine Arts  17  25 
Business Administration   35  23 
Science and Engineering   10  15 
 
Notes: The sample consists of students from general classes 
in psychology and economics at a comprehensive US university 
that has an annual undergraduate enrollment of about 5700. The 
population percentages are for the academic year in which the 
largest number of observations were collected. 
 
 
TABLE A2. Relevant and Irrelevant Information: 
   Tests of Differences in Means 
 
          H0: S = SR         H0: SR = SRI 
 
Question t-statistic p-value  t-statistic p-value 
      1  −6.23  .000    1.23  .222 
      2    5.96  .000  −0.83  .409 
      3  −6.86  .000    0.00  .997 
      4           −15.43  .000    1.07  .288 
      5  −9.89  .000    1.48  .142 
      6    5.45  .000  −0.40  .691 
 





TABLE A3. Regression Results for Figures 2 and 3 
     (1)     (2) 
    Mean H – Mean L 
           Response          Variance 
           (Figure 2)          (Figure 3) 
Question 2  10.48**  213.1* 
Question 3  −4.60   −334.6** 
Question 4  −3.80   −468.3** 
Question 5  7.10*   56.9 
Question 6  −2.65   −215.3* 
Constant  1.53   709.9** 
Base Information 11.97** 
Irrelevant  5.75* 
Relevant + Irrevelant 6.27* 
Stakeholder R     −290.6** 
Stakeholder I     −73.0 
Stakeholder R+I    −280.4** 
Spectator     −48.1 
Spectator R     −345.2** 
Spectator I     −47.8 
Spectator R+I     −284.7** 
Observations  24   48 
Adjusted R-squared 0.71   0.70 
Notes: ^ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01; the constant in regression (1) is the  
estimated coefficient for the omitted category R and in regression (2) is  
the estimated coefficient for the omitted category of Stakeholder variance 




TABLE A4. Regression Analysis: Moral Judgments of Spectators 
 
       Question 
Regressors           1. Environ. 2. Law          3. Bioethics     4. Accountab.         5. Need        6. Efficiency 
 
Relevant       18.96** −21.71** 14.14** 13.37** 32.95** −12.07** 
Relev+Irrelev       16.63** −17.38** 14.18** 12.23** 27.87** −10.51** 
Irrelevant       6.97^ 0.62  −2.21  −1.30  9.31*  −8.13** 
Gender        4.55^ 2.12  2.21  −0.40  −1.02  3.02 
Nonwhite       −3.64 0.61  1.27  −1.70*  8.63**  1.40 
Business       0.63 1.56  −1.42  −1.52^  −4.69  −2.65 
Comm/FineArts      0.56 −0.30  −1.47  −0.64  0.31  1.78 
Science/Engin       −1.50 0.21  −1.78  0.50  −1.76  5.48 
Class        −1.34 0.97  0.89  −0.62  −2.10  −1.41 
Age        0.34 1.23  0.64  0.13  1.97*  −1.24 
Expen($1000/yr)     −0.13 0.15  0.04  −0.00  −0.02  −0.06 
Parent income       −0.62 −0.36  −0.67  −0.21  0.51  0.56 
Hours work/wk       −0.13 −0.06  0.13  0.02  0.06  0.06 
Earn($1000/yr)       −0.14 −0.14  −0.08  −0.04  −0.18  0.23 
Observations       309  332  314  327  310  324 
R-squared       0.15 0.13  0.25  0.59  0.31  0.13 
Notes: The entries are regression coefficients, whereby omitted categories for the dummy variables are 
white, male and Liberal Arts College. 
^p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01 (two-tailed) 
 
 
TABLE A5. Regression Analysis: Moral Judgments of High Stakeholders 
 
       Question 
Regressors           1. Environ.  2. Law          3. Bioethics      4. Accountab.        5. Need        6. Efficiency 
Relevant       10.37* −35.59** 9.97**  10.64** 14.14** −14.91** 
Relev+Irrelev       12.10** −27.00** 15.69** 9.60**  7.82*  −15.33** 
Irrelevant       0.17 12.69*  −0.52  0.85  −6.15  −8.00* 
Gender        1.66 −2.55  0.79  −0.96  −1.02  6.54* 
Nonwhite       −6.91* 2.68  4.14  −0.44  −0.47  2.46 
Business       3.30 0.82  1.96  −2.01  −1.07  −3.49 
Comm/FineArts      11.48* −4.17  3.98  1.20  4.63  5.09 
Science/Engin       0.15 −3.71  −0.98  0.82  −2.73  −6.50 
Class        3.54 −10.65* 0.79  −0.24  5.15^  2.37 
Age        −2.44 8.08*  −1.64  −0.05  −4.43*  −0.34 
Expen($1000/yr)     −0.17 0.08  −0.02  −0.02  −0.12  −0.12 
Parent income       1.13 0.52  −0.97  0.00  0.09  0.76 
Hours work/wk       −0.12 0.34  0.05  0.02  0.09  0.27^ 
Earn($1000/yr)       −0.61 0.12  −0.08  0.12  −0.86  −0.61^ 
Observations       225  219  226  223  221  223 
R-squared       0.13 0.12  0.22  0.33  0.16  0.24 
Notes: The entries are regression coefficients, whereby omitted categories for the dummy variables are 
white, male and Liberal Arts College. 
^p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01 (two-tailed) 
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TABLE A6. Regression Analysis: Moral Judgments of Low Stakeholders 
 
       Question 
Regressors           1. Environ.  2. Law         3. Bioethics      4. Accountab.         5. Need        6. Efficiency 
Relevant       19.34** −15.43** 16.71** 10.27** 32.40** 1.06 
Relev+Irrelev       16.71** −15.88** 13.53** 9.50**  23.06** −11.68** 
Irrelevant       5.87 16.08** −0.01  −0.35  8.73^  −0.02 
Gender        0.89 5.43  −1.38  1.42  4.23  1.81 
Nonwhite       −3.28 0.98  −1.23  −2.35  8.25*  −1.59 
Business       5.99 −2.78  −3.15  −2.01  −3.48  1.20 
Comm/FineArts      4.68 −3.69  −0.39  −0.42  −4.32  6.00^ 
Science/Engin       −0.03 4.12  0.48  −3.66  −8.52  −8.76^ 
Class        2.69 −4.88  −0.72  4.77*  −6.78  2.85 
Age        −2.04 7.12^  0.58  −2.62^  3.13  −0.05 
Expen($1000/yr)     −0.05 0.13  −0.01  −0.04  0.01  −0.01 
Parent income       −0.73 0.32  −0.69  −0.01  −0.54  0.32 
Hours work/wk       −0.04 −0.15  −0.11  0.09  −0.20  0.30* 
Earn($1000/yr)       0.43 0.32  −0.08  −0.19  0.21  −0.34 
Observations       224  216  238  220  215  227 
R-squared       0.11 0.28  0.25  0.21  0.26  0.14 
Notes: The entries are regression coefficients, whereby omitted categories for the dummy variables are 
white, male and Liberal Arts College. 
^p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01 (two-tailed) 
 
 
TABLE A7. Tests of Differences in Estimated Coefficients for Regression (2) in Table A3 
 
                  Relevant      Irrelevant   Relev+Irrel       Base          Relevant     Irrelevant     Relev+Irrel 
                     Stakeholder  Stakeholder Stakeholder   Spectator      Spectator    Spectator        Spectator 
 
Base   −2.95        −0.74   −2.85          −0.49    −3.50         −0.49             −2.89 
Stakeholder 0.0060        0.4640   0.0070         0.6280    0.0010       0.6300           0.0070 
Relevant         4.87   0.01          6.06    0.31         6.07     0.00 
Stakeholder         0.0339   0.9188         0.0189    0.5827       0.0188     0.9525 
Irrelevant      4.43          0.06    7.63         0.07     4.61 
Stakeholder      0.0425         0.8017    0.0091       0.7996     0.0387 
Relev+Irrel              5.56    0.43         5.57     0.00 
Stakeholder              0.0241    0.5153       0.0239     0.9662 
Base           9.09         0.00     5.76 
Spectator          0.0048       0.9978     0.0218 
Relevant                9.11     0.38 
Spectator                0.0047     0.5428 
Irrelevant              5.78 
Spectator              0.0217 
 
Notes: The top entries in the first (Base Stakeholder) row are t-statistics and F-statistics otherwise; the 
bottom entries are p-values. 
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